Why are the Critics so Convinced that Globalization is Bad for the Poor? by Emma Aisbett
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
WHY ARE THE CRITICS SO CONVINCED THAT








The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research. 
 © 2005 by Emma Aisbett.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be
quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.  Why are the Critics so Convinced that Globalization is Bad for the Poor?
Emma Aisbett




Proponents of globalization often conclude that its critics are ignorant or self-motivated. In doing
so, they have missed a valuable opportunity to discover both how best to communicate the benefits
of globalization, and how to improve on the current model of globalization. This paper examines the
values, beliefs and facts that lead critics to the view that globalization is bad for the poor. We find
that critics of globalization tend to be concerned about non-monetary as well as monetary dimensions
of poverty, and more concerned about the total number of poor than the incidence of poverty. In
regard to inequality, critics tend to refer more to changes in absolute inequality, and income
polarization, rather than the inequality measures preferred by economists. It is particularly important
to them that no group of poor people is made worse off by globalization. Finally, we argue that the
perceived concentration of political and economic power that accompanies globalization causes
many people to presume that globalization is bad for the poor, and the continued ambiguities in the
empirical findings mean that this presumption can be readily supported with evidence.
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1. Introduction 
Economic globalization is a surprisingly controversial process.  Surprising, that is, to the 
many economists and policy makers who believe it is the best means of bringing prosperity to the 
largest number of people all around the world.  Proponents of economic globalization have had a 
tendency to conclude that dissent and criticism is the result of ignorance or vested interest 
(Bardhan, 2003). They have argued that anti-sweatshop campaigners do not understand that 
conditions in the factories owned by multi-nationals tend to be better than those in comparable 
domestic firms; that environmentalists are denying the world's poor of the right to develop freely; 
and unionists in developed countries are protecting their interests at the expense of the workers in 
poorer parts of the world.   
Bhagwati (2000, p.134) provides a good example of the way that some proponents of 
globalization have reacted to critics: 
“No one can escape the antiglobalists today.....This motley crew comes almost entirely from the rich 
countries and is overwhelmingly white, largely middle class, occasionally misinformed, often wittingly 
dishonest, and so diverse in its professed concerns that it makes the output from a monkey's romp on a 
keyboard look more coherent.” 
More recently, however, leading economists and policy-makers, including Bhagwati (2004, 
p.4), have been advocating for ‘reasoned engagement’ and ‘careful response’ to some of the more 
mainstream critics of globalization. There is a growing sense of the value of doing more than 
knocking down the straw men put forward by the extreme or the misinformed.  As Stanely Fischer 
(2003, p.2) says: 
“The debate [over globalization] is untidy and ill-defined, and one could react by saying that it has no 
place in a professional setting like this one. But we cannot afford to ignore it, for the views and attitudes 
expressed in it will inevitably affect public policy – and the issues are critically important for the future 
economic growth and well-being of people all the people of the globe.”    2
The aim of this paper is to help explain both the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of common criticisms 
of globalization’s record on poverty and inequality.  In particular, it addresses the question of why 
many people in rich countries believe that globalization has been bad for the poor in developing 
countries, and has worsened inequality.
1 
The answer to our question consists essentially of two parts. First, that neither the theory nor 
the empirical evidence on globalization and poverty is unarguably positive. Second, and more 
importantly, that people’s interpretation of the available evidence is strongly influenced by their 
values and by their beliefs about the process of globalization. 
Evidence for the first part of our argument is presented in Sections 2 & 3. Section 2 discusses 
the large amount of empirical work that has tried to identify causal links between globalization, 
poverty and inequality. We argue here that the linkages between globalization policies and poverty 
outcomes remain theoretically unclear and difficult to test empirically, and that more nuanced 
empirical research is required to address the remaining concerns with regard to globalization. 
Section 3 discusses some key trends in poverty and inequality numbers over the current ‘period of 
globalization’. Here we argue that the wide range of poverty and inequality estimates, which arises 
from apparently minor methodological differences, leaves ample room for a difference in opinion 
about the achievements of the last 25 years.   
Sections 4 & 5 comprise the second part of our answer. Section 4 shows that critics of 
globalization often have different conceptions of poverty and inequality than those preferred by 
economists. Section 5 argues that people are predisposed to thinking globalization is bad for the 
poor because they view the power structures of globalization as being biased towards the already 
rich and powerful.  Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
Before attempting to explain ‘anti-globalization’ sentiment, it is worthwhile clarifying what is 
meant by globalization and anti-globalization in the context of this paper.  That is the subject of 
the remainder of this section. 
                                                 
1 A recent survey conducted by the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2002) found that people in richer countries were 
more likely than people in poorer countries to believe that globalization benefited the poor less than the rich.   3
 
1.1.  Globalization 
Despite the fact that the definition of globalization has been attempted by hundreds of authors 
and distinguished speakers on the topic, the word continues to mean very different things to 
different people.  In light of this, we do not attempt any general definition of globalization, but 
rather explain what is meant by globalization in the context of this paper.   
In this paper, globalization refers to global economic integration, or 'economic globalization'.  
Economic globalization, including increases in trade, foreign investment, and migration, is widely 
agreed to be occurring through a combination of improvements in technology and decreased 
transportation costs, as well as deliberate policy choices on behalf of many national governments 
to liberalize their economies and participate in the development of global institutions. Thus the 
policy aspect of economic globalization is a cumulative outcome that results from the choices of 
many individual countries to increase their integration with the global economy.
2  
Given that globalization may be viewed as the cumulative result of increased integration on 
behalf of many individual countries, we need to consider how individual countries become 
integrated into the global economy. There are two broad approaches to measuring the extent to 
which a country is integrated with the global economy. The first approach is to determine the level 
of restrictions placed on the movement of goods, services and factors into and out of the country. 
Thus an absence of trade restrictions, liberalized capital markets, and free movement of labor 
could all be considered indicators of an integrated economy. The second measure of a country's 
                                                 
2 This idea that globalization is the aggregate result of individual country liberalization is made by Prasad et al. 
(2003).  Though it will not be a major issue in this paper, it is worth noting that the impact on a country of its own 
integration may be different from the impact of exogenous increases in globalization. Consider the case of Mexico. 
The impact of its own efforts at liberalization and integration may be to increase foreign trade and investment. At 
the same time, however, many other low and middle-income countries have been integrating, which leads to more 
competition for foreign capital and export markets. Thus exogenous increases in the level of global economic 
integration (i.e. economic globalization), and increases in Mexico's own level of integration, may have exactly 
opposite effects on the level of trade and investment in that country. Indeed this example is not far from reality. 
One of the conclusions of the Trade and Development Report, 2002 (UNCTAD, p.IX) is that middle income 
countries such as those in Latin America and South-East Asia will need to rapidly upgrade their skill intensive 
manufactures if they are to stay ahead of competition from low-income countries that are becoming increasingly 
export-oriented.    4
integration is the relative size of the flows of goods, services, factors, and profits into and out of 
the country. While these two measures are often used interchangeably, they are not identical 
concepts, and are not even highly correlated empirically (Harrison, 1996). Consider export 
subsidies. Viewed from the first perspective, these programs are akin to tariffs, and are decidedly 
contrary to the principle of economic globalization. Yet viewed from the second perspective, these 
programs can be seen to greatly increase the level of integration achieved. Indeed, having read 
many arguments from both sides, it seems to me that this ambiguity is a major reason that some 
people claim that the East Asian Tiger's success was based on pro-integration policies, while 
others claim the exact opposite. 
The distinction between policies and outcomes is important to the globalization debate. 
Analysis of popular writings and opinion surveys suggest that most people are happy with 
increases in trade in principle, yet they view policies of unregulated free markets and minimal 
government involvement much less favorably.
3  
Another linguistic issue of relevance to understanding the globalization debate is that 
criticisms of globalization are often actually criticisms of a broader neo-liberal policy agenda that 
globalization is believed to imply. Burgess (forthcoming, p.1) makes this point when he describes 
the difference between what economists (typically proponents of globalization) and public health 
advocates (often critics) mean when they refer to globalization/liberalization: 
“Whereas trade economists interpret liberalization to mean policies that eliminate trade and capital 
barriers at international borders, public health advocates consider the domestic policy changes that 
third world governments are obliged to accept in order to become full-fledged members of the IMF-
World Bank-Davos club of nations.” 
                                                 
3 For example, based on surveys of 18,797 people in 19 countries, Globscan reports that majorities in all countries 
except the United States (US) support opening up markets to poor countries. In the US support for opening up to 
poor countries was premised on the supply of increased government support for those who loose their jobs as a 
result of increased imports. Similarly, in a report that brings together all the available evidence on public opinion 
in the US, the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA, 2002) finds that most Americans do agree with 
free trade in principle, however, their support is contingent on complementary policies to address social and 
environmental concerns, as well as American job losses.   5
1.2.  'Anti-Globalization' 
Despite its popularity and convenience, in the remainder of this paper we avoid referring to 
the 'anti-globalization movement'. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, many of the concerns 
and positions that I discuss may be attributed to a far broader segment of the population than that 
which is actively involved in any movement. The use of such a label, and its application to street 
protesters, has a divisive effect between groups who in reality share many of the same concerns. In 
particular, it forces a wedge between academic economists and the concerned public. 
Secondly, as has been noted by many leading authors
4, the so-called 'anti-globalization' 
movement is not uniformly opposed to globalization as it is broadly defined. It is a fact that the 
movement itself is global, and all the leading writers of the movement reject the 'anti-
globalization' label.
5  Naomi Klein, 'unofficial spokesperson of the movement' has this to say 
about the term: 
“The irony of the media-imposed label, 'anti-globalization,' is that we in this movement have been 
turning globalization into a lived reality, perhaps more so than even the most multinational of corporate 
executives.”
6 
But what about globalization as defined here? People may enjoy the world-wide-web, and 
easy international travel, but what about the economic aspects of globalization? As will be argued 
in the following paragraphs, for the most part people are not opposed to the principle of global 
economic integration. They are, however, critical of the way in which it is currently progressing, 
and they do believe that the optimal level of integration will allow space for national sovereignty, 
democracy, and some government intervention to advance social and environmental agendas. We 
refer to these individuals as 'critics of globalization', and reserve the label 'anti-globalization' for 
people who would genuinely like to stop globalization dead in its tracks.  Globalization’s ‘critics’ 
will be the focus of this paper. 
                                                 
4See for example Sen (2002); Kanbur (2001); Ravallion (2003), Bhagwati (2004)  
5See for example Kortan (1996) 
6Quoted in Chihara (2002)    6
2. Questionable Causation  
 
As noted by Bardhan (2003), both sides of the globalization debate have had a tendency to 
claim an unreasonable degree of causation between liberalizing policies and observed trends in 
poverty and inequality. The claims of causation are so confounded that both sides claim the 
success of the Asian tigers as the result of their own policies, and the failure of many of the 
African states as the result of the opposite policies. Thus globalization’s proponents claim China 
and Taiwan's growth in recent decades as the result of liberalization of their economies, while 
globalization's critics claim that these same countries have been able to capitalize on the 
opportunities afforded by globalization because of extensive government intervention both in the 
past and present.  
Similarly, globalization’s proponents claim that many of Africa's economic problems are due 
to lack of openness and excessive, inappropriate government intervention.  Globalization's critics 
claim that Africa's woes come from other sources (including corrupt or incompetent governments), 
but the forced liberalization imposed by structural adjustment programs and other lending 
conditions has not delivered the promised growth. Instead globalization has only made living 
conditions worse for the poor as government services are cut back, and instability increased. 
An enormous research effort has been expended by economists in an attempt resolve these 
contradictory claims. This section will summarize the types of empirical research that have been 
conducted, and identify a set of stylized facts that have emerged from it. It then discusses why the 
empirical literature has not been as successful as many practitioners would hope in convincing 
skeptics of the benefits of globalization.  
Before proceeding, it is important to make clear what the current section and the following 
section on measurement of poverty and inequality do and, more importantly, do not try to achieve.  
Neither of them is in any way a comprehensive assessment of the literature which they are 
discussing.  They do not aim to produce a statement of the type “overall the empirical evidence   7
supports the conclusion that globalization is good/bad for the poor.”
7  Quite the contrary, their aim 
is to show how the empirical evidence to date leaves ample room for debate about the impact of 
globalization on the poor.  Accordingly, the approach taken in the following sections is to 
highlight only a few key statistics and empirical methods, as well as their limitations and biases. 
Reimer (2002) provides an excellent overview of the different empirical methods that have 
been employed in research on globalization and their findings. He categorizes the research 
methods under the following headings: 
  Cross-country regression analyses which test for correlations among trade, growth, income, 
poverty and inequality measured at the national level; 
  Partial equilibrium/ cost of living analyses which are typically based on household 
expenditure data and emphasize commodity markets and their role in determining poverty 
impacts; 
  General equilibrium studies that are generally based on disaggregated economy-wide Social 
Accounting Matrices, and account for commodity, terms of trade and factor market effects; 
and the newest approach 
  Micro-macro syntheses that involve general equilibrium analysis coupled with some form of 
post simulation analysis based on household survey data. 
One important method for analyzing the impacts of globalization is left off Reimer's list. I 
describe this category as micro-economic studies that test specific mechanisms (other than prices) 
through which globalization is believed to impact the poor. The findings of this literature have 
been summarized in a recent paper by two of the leading authors in this field, Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2004). 
                                                 
7Readers who are interested in more comprehensive assessments of the empirical literature may consider one of the 
several high quality survey papers, reports, and opinion pieces have already been devoted to these questions. See 
for example IMF (1997, Chapter IV); UNDP (1999); McKay, Winters & Kedir (2000); Reimer (2002); Bigman 
(2002); Berg & Krueger (2003); Bhagwati & Srinivasan (2002); Bourguignon et al (2002); Prasad et al. (2003); 
Baldwin (2003); Pavcnik and Goldberg (2004) & Winters (2004)    8
While each empirical approach suffers from its own set of limitations, in combination, the 
above types of empirical research have been successful in providing several points on which a 
relatively broad consensus has been reached:
8 
1.  Trade is correlated with, and often a source, of growth. 
2.  Growth is on average good for the poor. 
3.  U.S. and E.U. should liberalize their trade, particularly in agriculture and textiles. 
4.  FDI is correlated with, and often a source of, growth. 
5.  Liberalization of markets for short term capital can be detrimental and should be 
approached with caution. 
6.  Governments should provide safety nets to compensate the poor who lose as a result of 
liberalization. 
7.  TRIPs should be modified do limit negative impacts on provision of drugs to the poor. 
8.  Access to education, health, and credit are important factors in ensuring the poor benefit 
from globalization. These factors also increase the growth potential from openness. 
9.  Poverty should be measured using education and health as well as income. 
10. Excessive corporate power (market and political) is a problem. 
11. Capture of market or political power by elites has negative implications for growth and 
welfare. 
12. Political reform is needed in many developing countries. 
 
It is particularly reassuring to observe that these points of consensus in the academic literature 
have supported the furtive emergence of a middle ground in the public debate over globalization. 
                                                 
8 See for example: This volume, Harrison, A. (ed) (forthcoming) Globalization and Poverty, NBER;  IMF (1997, 
Chapter IV); UNDP (1999); McKay, Winters & Kedir (2000); Reimer (2002); Bigman (2002); Berg & Krueger 
(2003); Bhagwati & Srinivasan (2002); Bourguignon et al (2002); Prasad et al. (2004); Baldwin (2003); Pavcnik 
and Goldberg (2004); Bolaky & Freund (2004); & Winters (2004).   9
In reading publications from both sides, we observe an increasing number of participants who are 
wishing to move beyond competing and contradictory monologues and are willing to acknowledge 
some aspects of the argument presented by 'the other side'.  For example, Oxfam International is 
one of the leading non-governmental organizations campaigning on free trade issues. Their 
briefing prepared for the Doha round of trade talks begins: 
“International trade can be a force for poverty reduction by reducing scarcity, and by creating 
livelihoods and employment opportunities, but this is not an automatic process.  Liberalization is not a 
panacea for poverty any more than protectionism.” 
From the other side, we have the Economist magazine, a publication established specifically 
to promote the free market. Their 75
th Birthday special issue on capitalism and democracy 
identified personal greed on behalf of company executives, a vacuum of ownership in publicly 
traded firms, and an unsavory degree of mutual vested interest between government and 
businesses as the major threats to capitalism and democracy (Emmott, 2003).  
Heartening as such progress is, there are a large number of unresolved issues that make it 
impossible to feel that the globalization debate is close to consensus. A summary of remaining 
disagreements over globalization, poverty and inequality in developing countries is tabulated in 
Appendix 1. In the remainder of the current section, I consider some of the reasons why such 
disagreements persist, despite the prodigious research effort that has been exerted by economists 
to resolve them. In essence I see three reasons for the limited success. Firstly, these are very 
complex and difficult questions to answer. Secondly, the link between the empirical findings and 
the policy conclusions has until recently been given insufficient attention. And thirdly, much of 
the empirical research has not understood the underlying concerns of the critics, and has therefore 
failed to address the more nuanced but no less pivotal parts of the debate, such as the issues 
presented in Appendix 1. 
The literature on the impacts of globalization faces the same obstacles that the broader 
literature on growth faces. The trouble begins with the fact that there is no unambiguous    10
theoretical outcome, and thus everything must be tested empirically.
9 The trouble continues 
because the observable outcomes, growth, inequality, and poverty, are functions of a very large 
number of both past and present variables, and influence these other variables in return. In short, 
endogeneity plagues empirical research efforts on globalization. 
The result is that it is very difficult to prove in the case of an individual country exactly which 
factor or combination of factors was responsible for its success or lack thereof. For this reason, it 
is important to consider the experience of a number of countries. In order to do that, comparable 
individual country case studies must be conducted, or some form of cross-country comparison 
made.
10 The latter method usually involves statistical analysis based on a cross-country regression 
model.  
Cross-country regression studies have proved extremely useful for identifying correlations 
between relevant variables; however, they suffer some important methodological limitations when 
used for policy analysis.
11 Primary amongst these limitations are a lack of exogenous measures of 
openness, an inability to convincingly establish direction and strength of causality, and the 
economic simplifications required to use a linear regression framework. These limitations have led 
several leading economists to conclude that cross-country regressions should not be used as a 
basis for causal conclusions regarding the impacts of globalization.
12 These well-known 
limitations are also one of the reasons that critics of economic globalization remain unconvinced 
by the generally positive findings of such studies. 
It is heartening to see that there is a growing acknowledgement of the limitations of a black 
box approach to globalization and poverty, and increasing recognition among researchers of the 
importance of identifying the causal mechanisms through which globalization affects the poor.  
This approach is increasingly being represented by the contributions of this volume, as well as by 
Alan Winters (2000, 2002, 2004), and the current UNU-WIDER project on the Impact of 
                                                 
9Winters (2000); Agenor (2002) 
10 The former method was developed and applied very successfully in two projects, one by Little et al (1970) at the 
OECD and one lead by Bhagwati & Krueger for the NBER (Bhagwati & Srinivasan, 2002).  
11Deaton (1995); Ravallion (2003) 
12Bhagwati (2000); Bhagwati & Srinivasan (2002); Bardhan (2003); Ravallion (2003)   11
Globalization on the World’s Poor (UNU-WIDER, 2004). 
There is, however, a second reason that the empirical evidence to date has failed to convert 
critics of economic globalization into proponents. The reason is that the literature has not been 
well targeted towards addressing the remaining reservations that many people have about 
globalization. The mismatch between the questions currently being asked, and the answers people 
want, may be observed with reference to the list of 'Outstanding Disagreements' in Appendix 1.  
In my opinion, people do not need to be convinced that growth is generally good for the poor, 
or that increased trade is generally good for growth. As will be shown in later sections of this 
paper, the evidence from reading criticisms of globalization is that people are more interested in 
the optimal policy mix to maximize the benefits to the poor, while minimizing the negative 
impacts on any subgroup of the poor that is made worse off by such policies. They are also 
interested in ensuring that growth is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable. 
Social sustainability, it is assumed, requires inequality be kept under a certain limit.  
Consider the case of the debate over 'free trade'. Only a very small proportion of critics 
consider autarky to be an optimal trade policy. The vast majority agrees, like Oxfam, that trade 
can be beneficial. They disagree, however, with the conclusion that the optimal policy for a 
developing country is to unilaterally free trade without bargaining for any concessions from rich 
countries in return. Before they will agree with such a policy, they need to be convinced that it is 
preferable to the alternative position of a trade policy that includes some trade restrictions, some 
export support mechanisms, and some environmental, health, or labor regulations that may restrict 
trade.  
Thus the question in most critics minds is not “To Globalize or Not to Globalize?” but “What, 
and How Much to Globalize?” This way of thinking may be viewed within the context of the 
broader debate over pro-poor growth. Both Kanbur (2001) and Ravallion (2003) mention this 
debate in their papers on globalization and poverty. As Ravallion (2003, p.18-19) says: 
 
    12
“According to some observers “such actions are not needed...Growth is sufficient. Period.” (Bhalla, 
2002, p.206) The basis of this claim is the evidence that poverty reduction has generally come with 
economic growth. But that misses the point. Those who are saying that growth is not enough are not 
typically saying that growth does not reduce absolute income poverty....They are saying that combining 
growth-promoting economic reforms with the right [other] policies ....will achieve more rapid poverty 
reduction than would be possible otherwise.” 
3. Measurement of Poverty and Inequality 
The purpose of this section, and Section 4 after it, is to provide a taste of both the technical 
(this Section) and philosophical (next Section) issues in the measurement of poverty and 
inequality that are pertinent to the globalization debate.  It is important to understand these issues 
for two reasons. Firstly, trends in various measures of poverty and inequality are the bread and 
butter of participants on both sides of the globalization debate. Thus if we wish to understand why 
the two sides disagree, it is important to understand these trends. That being said, the reader is 
reminded that despite the claims of both sides, trends in either direction over the modern period of 
globalization (usually defined as the time since 1980) do not imply causation.  This brings us to 
the second reason that it is important to understand the debate over poverty and inequality 
measurement.  These measures are necessary inputs to any econometric study which does actually 
attempt to identify causal links between globalization and poverty or inequality.  No matter how 
sophisticated the theoretical model or econometric method is, the fact remains: Garbage in – 
Garbage out. 
The importance of improving measurement methodology beyond the current industry 
standard is argued by Deaton (2004, p.40), who says: 
“.. there is no credibility to the claim that globalization has been good for the poor based on a 
calculation that applies badly measured distributional shares to (upwardly biased) measures of growth 
from the national accounts. The globalization debate is serious enough that we must genuinely measure 
the living standards of the poor, not simply assume them. We cannot prove that growth trickles down by 
assuming that growth trickles down, nor argue that globalization has reduced poverty without 
measuring the living standards of the poor.”   13
3.1.  Poverty 
Despite the existence of a multitude of different poverty measures, many of which may be 
technically superior, the discussion in this section is limited to the world poverty headcount.  This 
particular measure was chosen both because it is the simplest one and because it is arguably the 
most often quoted in the globalization debate.  As will be obvious from the discussion that 
follows, the calculation of even this most simple of measures involves enough technical detail to 
confuse the inexpert, and to promote a vigorous scholarly debate. 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the most widely cited current estimates of the world 
poverty headcount. It can be seen that even very rigorous authors have produced different 
estimates of the same statistic. The reasons for these very different results may be largely 
explained by a few key differences in method. We discuss these differences below. Also included 
in the discussion are the claims by some authors that all of the estimates in Table 1 significantly 
underestimate the level of poverty. 




















1.20 24.0  +1.4  1.08  HHS  WBPPP93 Chen & Ravallion (2000), Table 2
2.80 56.0 +22.9  2.15  HHS  WBPPP93 Chen & Ravallion (2000), Table 3
0.35 6.7  -3.3  1.08  NAcc  PWTV6  Sala-i-Martin (2002a), Table 1 
0.97 18.6  -20.0  2.15  NAcc  PWTV6  Sala-i-Martin (2002a), Table 1 
0.46 9.2 -30.8  1.08  NAcc  WBPPP93 Bhalla (2003), Table 1 
0.37  7.4  -22.6  1.15  NAcc  PWTV6  Bhalla (2003), Table 1 
Notes for Table 1: 
Ave. Change - total change in the headcount over the period 1987-98, divided by 11 years. 
HHS – household survey data 
NAcc – national accounts data 
WBPPP93 – World Bank Purchasing Power Parity conversion using base year 1993. Uses Elteto, Koves and Szulc 
method.  
PWTV6 – Penn World Tables Purchasing Power Parity conversion using base year 1996. Uses Geary-Khamis 
method. 
Chen & Ravallion (2000) are essentially responsible for generating the most recent World Bank figures. 
Total Headcount and Ave. Change for Bhalla (2003) were calculated from his reported incidence figures, using the 
same population size as Chen & Ravallion (2000). 
Sala-i-Martin's incidence is based on the total world population, rather than the population of developing countries as 
used by the other authors.    14
Choosing a Poverty Line 
The first step in generating a poverty headcount is to choose a poverty line. Since 1991, the 
standard poverty line has been approximately $US1 per day, in purchasing power parity terms. 
This line was originally chosen as being representative of the poverty lines in low-income 
countries.
13 It is also common to report poverty figures for a line set at twice this value, $US2 per 
day.  
The World Bank's $1 per day and $2 per day poverty lines have been criticized for being 
arbitrary, and arbitrarily too low, which means that they underestimate the number of people living 
in poverty.
14 The importance of the choice of poverty line to the estimated headcount can be 
observed in Table 1. It can be seen that the headcount for the current $2 per day line is more than 
twice that for the $1 per day line. More importantly, the upward trend in the headcount is more 
than ten times as high using the $2 per day line. The significance of the choice of poverty line is 
also highlighted by the latest poverty estimates from the World Bank (Chen & Ravallion, 2004). 
They find that the number of people living below $1.08 per day fell dramatically from 1981 to 
2001, by just under 400 million (representing approximately a halving in the incidence of poverty 
as a fraction of world population). However, the number of people living between the $1.08 and 
$2.15 lines increased even more, by around 680 million. As a result, the estimated number living 
under the $2.15 poverty line actually increased by 285 million between 1981 and 2001. 
While acknowledging that there was an element of arbitrariness to the original choice of $1 
and $2 per day, Deaton (2001) argues that the data consistency losses from defining a new poverty 
line would outweigh any benefits obtained. 
Estimating the Incomes of Different Groups within One Country 
There are two main methods of estimating the economic wellbeing of the population of a 
country. The first is use national accounts data to estimate the mean income, and household-level 
survey data to estimate the income distribution. The second is to use household survey data to 
                                                 
13Chen & Ravallion (2000) 
14 Wade (2002) and Pogge & Reddy (2003).   15
directly calculate the incomes of each decile in the income distribution.  
Deaton (2003) explains the main difference between these two methods arises from the fact 
that the household surveys (HHS) lead to a lower estimate of average income than the national 
accounts (NAcc), and that the difference between the two increases as incomes increase. This is 
true when comparing richer and poorer countries at the same time period, and when comparing the 
same countries over time. There are three main causes of this discrepancy. Firstly, richer people 
tend to understate the income by more than poorer people. Secondly, richer people tend to respond 
less often to household income or expenditure surveys. Thirdly, according to Deaton (2003), 
national accounts data tends to overestimate the growth rate of per capita income. On the other 
hand, Bhalla (2003) has argued vigorously that the national accounts estimates are far more 
accurate, and accuses the World Bank of biasing their estimates in order to obtain more funding. 
The impact of the difference between these two methods is illustrated in Table 1. It is clear 
that HHS based estimates produce significantly more pessimistic estimates of both the total 
number of poor, and the reductions in the number of poor.  
Maintaining Consistency Across Countries 
The third contentious issue in the calculation of world poverty figures is the way in which 
incomes are compared across countries. The main criticism is that the consumption basket used to 
estimate purchasing power parities (PPP) does not reflect the consumption patterns of the poor.
15 
The baskets of goods and services used in all the World Bank's PPP calculations are based on a 
representative national consumption bundle, not the bundle of goods typically consumed by the 
poor. This means that because basic needs are relatively more expensive in poor countries the use 
of such 'broad gauge' PPP measures overestimates the purchasing power of the incomes of the 
poor in developing countries. Wade (2002), Pogge & Reddy (2003) estimate this effect to be in the 
order of 30-40%. 
A related issue in the comparison of incomes across countries is the way in which the prices 
                                                 
15 Wade (2002), Pogge & Reddy (2003) and Deaton (2001)    16
are combined to produce PPP exchange rates. The World Bank uses the Elteto, Koves and Szulc 
(EKS) method, while the Penn World Tables are based on the Geary-Khamis (GK) method.   
According to Dowrick (2001) the GK method tends to overestimate the incomes of the poor, while 
the EKS method leads to a very slight underestimation. This issue is discussed further in the 
section on the calculation of inequality measures. 
Maintaining Consistency Across Time 
The method used by the World Bank and the other authors in Table 1 involves comparison 
between countries on PPP terms in some specified year, followed by country-by-country, year-to-
year adjustments in real income based on national consumer price indexes (CPI). The problem 
with this methodology, as noted by Deaton (2001), is that the use of a different base year causes 
changes in poverty estimates that overshadow the magnitude of any real trend. Among other 
things, this means that poverty headcounts using different base years cannot be compared. As 
noted by Wade (2002), it was the comparison of headcounts based on two different PPP base years 
that generated the much cited claim by the World Bank that the poverty headcount had decreased 
by 200 million over the period 1980 to 1998. 
In addition to the arbitrary changes in poverty headcount that are brought on by updating the 
PPP base year, there may also be systematic biases.  Pogge & Reddy (2003) argue that ongoing 
updating of the PPP base year will cause the overestimation of the incomes of the poor to get 
progressively worse as average incomes rise. This means that over time, as the base year is 
updated, the poverty headcount will fall, irrespective of what is actually happening to the poor.  
The preceding discussion has illustrated that the official World Bank poverty figures are 
simultaneously attacked from the left on the grounds that they outrageously underestimate the 
extent of poverty and overestimate the gains made in recent years, and attacked from the right on 
the grounds that they do exactly the opposite. Both the right and the left claim that the Bank is 
manipulating its chosen methodology for political reasons. This is an unfortunate state of affairs, 
which makes it very difficult for disinterested participants in the globalization debate to form an 
objective opinion.   17
There are undoubtedly weaknesses in the current poverty accounting practices of the World 
Bank that leave it vulnerable to such criticisms.  Some of these weaknesses are implicit in the 
attempt to summarize all the deprivation in the entire world into a single number, and will never 
be resolved.  However, some of the weaknesses can be reduced as methodology continues to 
evolve and improve. A good first step would be to follow Deaton’s (2001) recommendation that a 
locally validated set of PPP poverty lines be developed and then held fixed, thus eliminating the 
large variations brought on by changes in PPP base year.  
 
3.2.  Inequality 
The numbers debate over global inequality has every bit of the complexity of that over 
poverty, plus one additional layer.  That additional layer is the question of what sample best 
represents “world inequality”.  Should we consider every citizen as a member of a single global 
income distribution? Or should we recognize the existence of national boarders and talk about 
‘within country’ and ‘between country’ components of inequality?  The answer, of course, is that 
each measure has its different merits, and each will be preferable in different contexts. 
This section will focus on world inequality calculated assuming that there are no borders, 
referred to from here on as ‘world inequality’
16.  This measure has been chosen on the basis of two 
major merits.  Firstly, it is the concept most analogous to the world poverty headcount, which was 
discussed under the previous heading.  Secondly, it is the concept that most represents what 
globalization is all about.  Indeed, one of the reasons that globalization has been associated with a 
rise in concern over global inequality could be that people are beginning to think more as global 
citizens.  Consumers in rich countries see that the global economy connects them to the very 
poorest farmers in developing countries, and that makes them feel that they have the power, 
indeed the responsibility, to make the world a fairer place. 
                                                 
16 Recently two excellent papers (Sutcliffe, 2004; Svedberg, 2004) have been published that provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the debate over inequality in the age of globalization.  These papers cover, among other 
points, the debate over population weighting in inter-country inequality estimates.    18
 
The one major disadvantage of the ‘no borders’ approach to calculating inequality is that it is 
possibly the least relevant to policy analysis.  Thus it is worth spending a paragraph to summarize 
a few broadly accepted ‘facts’ about the other measures and their trends in recent decades.
17  To 
begin with, everyone agrees that the lion’s share, of the order of two thirds or more, of inequality 
in the world is due to between-country inequality, and that this share has changed little since 1980.  
Most experts would agree that since 1980 within-country inequality has increased in more 
countries than it has decreased.  Most would also agree that between-country inequality has 
increased if all countries are given equal weight.  On the other hand, many would also agree that 
between-country inequality has decreased if countries are weighted by population.
18 Finally, 
almost all would agree that the driving force underlying any inequality calculations over the period 
has been the fact that major economies especially at the very poor end (China and India), but also 
at the very rich end (US and UK), experienced a combination of growth and increased within-
country inequality. 
‘World inequality’, the measure that we are mostly concerned with in this chapter, is 
essentially the sum of between-country and within-country inequality. This means that the fact 
that India and China both grew and experienced increased internal inequality causes estimates of 
changes in ‘world inequality’, to consistently lie between the estimates of changes in between-
country inequality calculated using alternatively unit weights or population weights for each 
country.
19  It is, therefore, not surprising that some authors find that world inequality is increasing, 
while others find it is decreasing. 
                                                 
17 This paragraph based on the reading the following papers: Dowrick & Akmal (2001), Milanovic (2002), Sala-i-
Martin (2002a,b), Wade (2002), Ravallion (2003), Crook (2003), Galbraith (2003), Fischer (2003), Loungani 
(2003) 
18 This latter finding, however, is dependent on whether incomes are compared on exchange rate or purchasing power 
parity (PPP) terms, with PPP the more widely accepted basis, and the one which more often leads to the 
conclusion that inequality has fallen.  Dowrick & Akmal (2001) argue that both exchange rate and PPP are biased, 
and that when the bias is removed from PPP, very little change is found in population weighted between-country 
inequality over the period 1980-97. 
19 Estimates of a potential upward trend in ‘world inequality’ are lower than those of between-country inequality 
because ‘world inequality’ implicitly weights countries by population. On the other hand, because ‘world 
inequality’ accounts for the rise in within-country inequality, the trend is generally higher than that suggested by 
population weighted between-country inequality alone.   19
 
Though there are many variations in methodology for calculating world inequality, most of 
the variation in results arises from two sources, both of which were also important to the debate 
over poverty headcount.  The first is the use of national accounts data verses household survey 
data to calculate mean national income.  The second is the use of the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) verses exchange rate to convert between incomes in different countries.
20  The impact of 
these methodological differences on the results obtained can be seen in Table 2, and in graphical 
form in Figure 1.  Note that though the results presented in Table 2 and Figure 1 are based only on 
the Gini coefficient, the qualitative conclusions of each of the methodologies are robust to the use 
of several common measures of inequality. 
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Please see notes on following page for further explanation of abbreviations. 
                                                 
20 There are several methods for calculating purchasing power parity, however, most studies use the Penn World 
Tables PPP figures. These are based on the Geary-Khamis method. See Summers & Heston (1991) for details.     20
Notes for Table 2: 
Sala-i-Martin (2002b) actually obtains estimates for all years from 1970 – 1998. Table 2 and Figure 1, however, 
present only those years that overlap with another study. 
Rate of Change - total change in the Gini from start year to end year divided by number of years between. 
HHS – household survey data 
NAcc – national accounts data 
PPP – purchasing power parity. Sala-i-Martin and Dorick & Akmal use Penn World Tables PPP data, based on the 
Geary-Khamis method.  Milanovic uses the EKS (Elteto, Koves and Szulc) method to calculate PPP. 
XR – exchange rate   
Afriat – an alternative PPP conversion designed to eliminate the biases typically present in GKPPP. See Dowrick & 
Akmal (2001) for details. 
 
As was the case with the poverty estimates, the use of household survey data gives a 
significantly more pessimistic view of recent decades.  Using household survey data only, 
Milanovic (2002, forthcoming) finds that world inequality increased at a rate of around 0.2 Gini 
points per year. Using national accounts data to find average incomes, Sala-i-Martin (2002b) finds 
that world inequality decreased at the rate of about 0.2 Gini points per year over the same 
period.
21  This is despite the fact that the two had very similar estimates for the initial inequality in 
1988. 
The work of Dowrick and Akmal (2001) and Dowrick (2001) illustrates the sensitivity of 
inequality calculations to the choice of currency conversion when national accounts data is used to 
find average incomes.  Dowrick and Akmal (2001) argue that both exchange rates and purchasing 
power parities (PPP) based on the Geary-Khamis method are biased means of conversion.
22  To 
correct for these biases, they recommend and apply a PPP measure based on an Afriat index which 
they argue is a ‘true’ money-metric measure of relative utility.  Not surprisingly, both the level and 
the trend in inequality based on Dowrick and Akmals’ Afriat index lie between the corresponding 
values based on Geary-Khamis PPP and exchange rate.  On balance, the Afriat index shows a very 
slight increase in inequality over the period 1980-93. 
                                                 
21 Note that the two authors also differ in the PPP conversion method.  Sala-i-Martin uses the Penn World Tables data 
based on the Geary-Khamis method.  Milanovic uses the EKS (Elteto, Koves and Szulc) method.  As is explained 
below, this difference also works to exaggerate the difference between the inequality trends identified by the two 
authors. 
22 Dowrick (2001) discusses the EKS method of calculating PPP in addition to the GK method.  He finds that EKS 
measures of relative incomes are much closer to the ‘true’ Afriat measures than GK measures.  He also finds that 
while the GK measure leads to a downward bias in estimates of inequality between countries, the EKS measure 
leads to a slight upward bias.   21
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Figure 1 - Graphical Representation of the Numbers in Table 2 
 
According to Sala-i-Martin (2002b), the major difference between his methodology and that 
of Dowrick and Akmal is that he includes a larger number of countries in his sample.  Sala-i-
Martin notes that the bias in the countries which are excluded from Dowrick and Akmal’s sample 
leads to an underestimate of the increases in inequality over their chosen time period.  This would 
suggest that if the larger sample of Sala-i-Martin was combined with the unbiased PPP conversion 
of Dowrick and Akmal, we would find that world inequality rose slightly over the period 1980-93. 
    22
4. Concepts of Poverty and Inequality 
 
The central question in this paper is why some people believe that globalization is bad for the 
poor, while others believe quite the opposite.  The previous two sections have argued that part of 
the answer to this question is that the technical literature on globalization and poverty faces 
methodological issues, some of which simply may not be resolvable to the satisfaction of all sides. 
However, if technical issues were the only cause, then we would expect to see a world populated 
by people sitting on the globalization fence, who are awaiting further evidence before coming 
down on either. This is clearly not the world in which we live. 
The following two sections propose two explanations for why the critics have been able to 
come to such strong conclusions based on the existing evidence.
23 Firstly, in the current section, 
we argue that there are subtle differences in values held by critics and proponents, which lead 
them to interpret the evidence differently. Specifically, it leads them to have different 
interpretations of value-laden phrases such as ‘worsening poverty’ and ‘growing inequality’. Then 
in Section 5 we argue that critics and proponents interpret the technical evidence differently 
because they have different opinions on the ‘deep facts’
24, that is, the fundamental processes 
underlying globalization. 
In arguing the importance of values as filters through which people process facts that are 
presented to them, we follow the tradition of economists and social thinkers such as Robbins 
(1932), Samuelson (1947), Graaff (1962), and Robinson (1964).  More recently, Dasgupta (2004, 
p.3) says: 
“... facts can be as subject to dispute as are values, in part because facts and values are often 
entangled.” 
                                                 
23 Though the discussion in this paper focuses on why the critics have formed strong conclusions against 
globalization, the principles here could equally be used to explain to an audience of critics or skeptics why the 
proponents of globalization have been able to form such strong convictions on the topic. 
24 Dasgupta (2004, p.3) describes ‘deep facts’ as “the pathways that characterise social, political, and ecological 
systems”.   23
The implication of people’s inherently ‘filtered’ interpretation of evidence is that, although 
economists should continue to make every effort to improve the quality of ‘the facts’ on 
globalization and poverty, we should not expect that this strategy alone will ever end the debate. 
As Putnam (1993, p. 146) writes: 
“It is all well and good to describe hypothetical cases in which two people "agree on the facts and 
disagree about values", but ... (w)hen and where did a Nazi and an anti-Nazi, a communist and a social 
democrat, a fundamentalist and a liberal ... agree on the facts?” 
4.1.  Poverty 
This section seeks to identify and explain the concepts of poverty that are most often 
employed by critics of economic globalization. It will show that the concepts employed by critics 
tend to be ones that lead to a more pessimistic conclusion about the impact of globalization on 
poverty.  This choice of concepts by critics could be viewed as simply a cynical means of 
supporting their prior position.  However, this section will argue that their choice of definition of 
poverty is equally well explained by values and social preferences that many critics hold.   
This section builds on the work of Ravi Kanbur (2001), who identified several dimensions 
along which conceptions of poverty tend to vary. They are: 
  total number of poor verses poverty incidence,  
  monetary verses multi-dimensional measures, 
  level of aggregation, and 
  time horizon. 
 
Numbers verses Incidence 
Both Ravallion (2003) and Kanbur (2001) observe that the relative importance of the total 
number of poor and the incidence of poverty is one of the major points of difference in the 
globalization debate. Academic economists and international development agencies such as the 
World Bank and UNDP rely almost entirely on incidence as the appropriate measure, while critics    24
of economic globalization refer almost without exception to the total number of people living in 
poverty. The following “Globalization Facts and Figures” reported by the International Forum on 
Globalization
25 illustrates this focus. 
“Excluding China, there are 100 million more poor people in developing countries than a decade ago. - 
The World Bank, Annual Review of Development Effectiveness, 1999 
Since 1980, economic decline or stagnation has affected 100 countries, reducing the incomes of 1.6 
billion people. For 70 of these countries, average incomes are less in the mid 1990s than in 1980, and in 
43, less than in 1970. - United Nations Human Development Report, 1999”  
We can understand the different focus of the two groups very easily if we consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of the two concepts. If, for example, we want to make inter-country 
comparisons, then poverty incidence makes much more sense as a measure.
26 Poverty incidence 
also allows the poverty outcomes of a policy to be evaluated independent of the impact of 
population growth. These are all things that economists and development specialists wish to do. 
These ‘poverty professionals’ also tend to believe that poverty incidence is a better indicator of 
how the ease with which poverty could be eliminated in the next period.
27  Thus a decrease in the 
poverty incidence is considered to be progress against poverty, even if the total number of poor 
has not changed or has risen slightly, because the country is now in a better position to fight 
poverty in the next period. It has also been argued by Sala-i-Martin (2002a) that a veil of 
ignorance argument suggests that poverty incidence is the more appropriate welfare measure than 
poverty headcount. He asks where we would prefer our children to be born “in a country of a 
million people with half a million poor (poverty rate of 50%) or in a country of two million people 
and 600,000 poor (a poverty rate of 33%)”. 
                                                 
25IFG Bulletin, 2001, Volume 1, Issue 3, Available at 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Globalization/Globalization_FactsFigures.html 
26It is possible, however, to conceive of alternative measures that could be used for inter-country comparisons. For 
example, one could compare “poverty reduction rates” in much the same way that GDP growth is used as the 
primary measure of overall economic performance. 
27Consider for example two countries that both have with one million poor people. One country has only one thousand 
rich people and the other has ten million rich people. It is obvious that the latter country is in a much better 
position financially to eradicate poverty.   25
 
For people outside the economics profession, the utility of a poverty measure as an analytical 
tool is less important. Their focus tends to be directly on the goal, and that goal is to minimize the 
number of people that are deprived of basic needs. Further, many would argue that there are ways 
in which the total number of people remaining poor is a better measure of how easy it will be to 
eradicate poverty in the future. This view is based on environmental limits or neo-Malthusian 
perspectives.
28 
As it turns out, using total number of poor or using poverty incidence does make a difference 
to the conclusions that one draws from an assessment of world poverty trends. Though there is 
significant variation in the estimates obtained using different methods or different time periods
29, 
all of the estimates show a decrease in the incidence of poverty since the 1980s. The total number 
of extreme poor, however, has been variously found to increase
30, stay the same
31, slightly 
decrease
32, or significantly decrease
33. Excluding China, or using a higher poverty line, there is 
evidence of a significant increase in the total number of poor.
34  
Monetary verses Multi-Dimensional Measures 
Kanbur (2001) argues that critics of globalization tend to think of poverty as a multi-
dimensional concept, rather than something that can be fully captured by measures of average 
income or expenditure. In this regard, critics are now on the same side as the majority of 
development economists.
35 Kanbur (p.1085) notes that health and education outcomes are now 
                                                 
28The argument is, that if the creation of goods ultimately depends on environmental resources, and those resources 
are limited, then an increase in the number of poor people in the world is always a bad sign. Thus this group tend 
to see poverty as the result of lack of access to resources, more than a lack of economic activity. 
29For discussions of the issues involved in calculating poverty estimates, and the different results obtained see Wade 
(2002), Ravallion (2003), Deaton (2001), Deaton (2002) as well as the original source articles cited. 
30World Bank, World Development Report 2000/01 
31World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 
32Chen & Ravallion (2002) 
33World Bank (2002). Note that their estimate of a 200mill. reduction in the number of poor is based on comparison of 
numbers generated by two incompatible methodologies (Wade, 2002). 
34Chen & Ravallion (2002). In this paragraph references to the number of extreme poor are based on a poverty line set 
at approximately $1/day, while the higher poverty line referred to is $2.15/day. 
35 Thorbecke (2003), Kanji & Barrientos (2002), Kanbur (2001)    26
agreed to be “on a par with income in assessing poverty and the consequences of economic 
policy”. Evidence of the importance now placed on health and education outcomes is provided by 
the UNDP's “Human Development Report 2003”, the World Bank's “World Development Report 
2000”, the World Bank and UNDP's joint efforts on the “Millennium Goals”. 
Though harder to quantify, empowerment, participation, and vulnerability to shocks are also 
gaining acceptance as important dimensions of poverty.
36 The inclusion of these additional 
dimensions seems justified by the priorities of the poor themselves. A major study “Voices of the 
Poor: can anyone hear us?” was published by the World Bank in 2000. They found that poverty 
was indeed multi-dimensional, and that lack of material well-being, humiliation, absence of basic 
infrastructure, illiteracy, illness, and lack of physical assets (as opposed to income) formed the 
major issues. 
The opinions of the poor also seem to suggest that the impact of globalization on their lives is 
less positive than measures of changes in their average income would suggest. Graham (2001) 
reports that the perceptions of the poor and middle-class of their welfare change from national 
integration and liberalization are systematically below what is suggested by their measured income 
change.  Similarly, as Clare Short and James Wolfenson say in the foreword to “Voices of the 
Poor”
37: 
“What poor people share with us is sobering. The majority of them feel they are worse off and more 
insecure than in the past.” 
People’s self-perceptions, of course, are always prone to subjectivity and bias.  So what do 
external measures of poverty’s ‘other dimensions’ suggest about the impact of globalization?  As 
proponents of globalization like to note, there have been significant improvements in literacy 
rates, life-expectancy and infant mortality over the last 25 years.
38 As with the monetary measures, 
however, the use of numbers rather than incidence tells a somewhat less laudable story.  For 
                                                 
36Kanbur (2001); World Development Report (2000)  
37Narayan et al. (2000, p.ix) 
38 For example Fischer (2003), Loungani (2003)   27
example, while the world rate of illiteracy fell by a third between 1980 and 2002, the total number 
of illiterate adults in the world decreased by a mere 1.4% over the same period.
39 Similar patterns 
hold for other measures such as infant mortality, and access to clean water and sanitation. 
Moving beyond an analysis of trends, Wei and Wu (2002) find evidence from an econometric 
study using data from 79 countries, that a faster increase in trade openness is associated with a 
faster increase in life expectancy and a faster reduction in infant mortality. However, they find no 
corresponding evidence for financial integration. Also on the issue of health, Deaton (2004) argues 
that one’s perception of the impact of globalization is also dependent on what one means by 
globalization. He suggests that the things economists tend to think of in regard to globalization, 
such as increased incomes and faster diffusion of health related knowledge and technologies, are 
beneficial to the health of the poor. On the other hand, some of the institutional aspects of 
globalization, which are the focus of many critics concerns, may not be so beneficial. In particular, 
he suggests that the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) may restrict the freedom of 
governments to shape their health delivery systems, and the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement may make provision of drugs in poor countries, particularly 
for HIV/AIDS, more expensive than necessary.  
With regard to voice and empowerment, proponents of globalization point out that the period 
of globalization has been accompanied by the spread of democracy.
40  In contrast, will be 
explained in Section 5, many critics believe that voice and empowerment are among the first 
casualties of globalization. They believe that globalization shifts decision-making to higher and 
higher levels of government, well beyond the potential for meaningful democratic participation 
from the poor.
41  These two opinions are not, however, as incompatible as they at first appear.  
Proponents of globalization seem to be talking about whether or not the system is in each country 
                                                 
39 Source World Resources Institute ‘EarthTrends’ database. The world literacy rate rose from 69.3% in 1980 to 
80.2% in 2002. The total number of illiterate in the world rose from 883 million in 1980 to a peak of 890 million 
in 1988 and has been falling steadily since then to around 871 million in 2002.  This was helped in large part by 
China in which the number of illiterate has been falling steadily from 222 million in 1980 to 145 million in 2002, 
and hampered by India where the number has been rising steadily from 250 million in 1980 to 291 million in 2002. 
40 For example Fischer (2003), Micklethwait & Wooldridge (2000) 
41See IFG (2003). See also Bardhan & Mookherjee (2000) who claim that political centralization may exacerbate 
problems of capture in the presence of inequality.    28
is fundamentally democratic, while critics of globalization are talking about the realities of voice 
and participation within those countries that are already ostensibly democratic. 
Aside from the impact on democratic participation, there are two other major claims made 
against globalization on the basis of non-monetary dimensions of poverty.  The first is that it 
increases vulnerability to shocks, and the second is that reduced tariff revenues and neoliberal 
policies associated with globalization lead to cutbacks in government services important to the 
poor. 
Kanbur (2001, p.1087) provides a list of the type of services people envisage as being harmed 
by globalization, but not recorded in monetary measures of poverty: 
 “If the bus service that takes a woman from her village to her sister's village is canceled, it will not show 
up in these [monetary] measures. If the health post in the urban slum runs out of drugs, it will not show up. 
If the primary school text books disappear, or if the teacher does not show up to teach, it will not show up.” 
Thankfully, there has been a large amount of research effort directed at evaluating the 
concerns over both vulnerability and government service provision.  To attempt to summarize the 
conclusions of this research is to do a grave injustice to this extensive literature.  However, for our 
purposes, with the help of Winters (2004), we offer the following.  Firstly, there is agreement that 
capital account liberalization can lead to increased macroeconomic volatility in developing 
countries.
42 Similarly there is evidence that the removal of government price support mechanisms 
can increase volatility of income for those dependent on the sale of agricultural commodities.  
However, the impact of other aspects of liberalization, such as trade liberalization, has been found 
to be sometimes stabilizing and sometimes destabilizing.  Finally, there is little evidence to 
support the claim that trade liberalization and structural adjustment packages in developing 
countries lead to cutbacks in the provision of public goods for the poor.
43 
 
                                                 
42 Bhagwati (1998), Fischer (2003), Prasad et al (2003) 
43 Winters (2004)   29
Level of Aggregation and Time Horizon 
It is often perplexing to economists to hear people refer to globalization 'worsening poverty' 
even in situations in which it is clear that the total number of people in poverty has fallen. Part of 
the explanation for this puzzling view is that many people consider the phrase 'worsening poverty' 
to be apposite in any situation in which a significant number of already poor people are made 
poorer. Kanbur (2001) attributes the greater concern that critics of globalization have for those 
who lose from the process to a smaller geographical perspective, or lower level of aggregation, 
and different time horizon.  He explains the smaller geographic perspective as follows (Kanbur, 
2001, p.1087): 
“For an NGO working with street children in Accra, or for a local official coping with increased 
poverty among indigenous peoples in Chiapas, it is cold comfort to be told, 'but national poverty has 
gone down'.” 
With regard to time horizon, Kanbur suggests that critics of globalization have at once a 
shorter term and a longer-term world-view than many of its proponents. The shorter-term view is 
the one that leads critics to feel particularly concerned about the loss of income by certain 
subgroups as a result of globalization-induced changes in the economy. This short-term view is 
contrasted with the medium term perspective of economists. In the medium term it is argued that 
globalization will promote new industries, and better jobs will become available to replace those 
that had been lost.  
According to critics of globalization, the pertinent question is whether the people who lost 
their livelihoods in the short term are likely to be the same ones that gain a new and better source 
of income in the medium term.  In the case of middle aged or older people, or where lack of 
education and poor geographical mobility limit access to new opportunities, it may be the case that 
the losers remain losers, for the rest of their life.
44  
                                                 
44Ravallion (2003, p.16) provides some empirical evidence in support of this concern. He claims that, when analyzing 
the poverty impact of economic integration: 
“...it is quite common to find considerable churning under the surface. Some people have escaped poverty while    30
The problem with Kanbur’s explanation based on geographical scope and time horizon is that 
is does not fully complete the picture. His examples of NGO workers and local officials working 
with the poor do not explain why large numbers of people who work in office jobs in rich 
countries also appear to use the losses of certain subgroups as their criterion for claiming that 
globalization has ‘worsened poverty’.   
I propose a more basic explanation: that people simply do not like to see poor people being 
made worse off.  This could be interpreted as an indication that critics of globalization support a 
Rawlsian notion of social welfare, as opposed to the utilitarian notion that is popular among 
economists. Another explanation is that although the rational side of most personalities will tend 
towards a utilitarian perspective, the social side of those same personalities will find personal 
tragedies such as the suicide of South Korean farmer Lee Kyung Hae at the WTO meeting in 
Cancun highly compelling. As behavioral economists are finding more and more, we are often not 
consistent in our framing of such complex values. More recent evidence from behavioral 
experiments, suggests yet another potential explanation: the critics are simply displaying a very 
common human characteristic. After conducting experiments based on hypothetical allocation 
decisions (unrelated to globalization), Baron (2003, p.1) finds that: 
“People are reluctant to harm some people in order to help others, even when the harm is less than the 
forgone help (the harm resulting from not acting). The present studies use hypothetical scenarios to 
argue that these judgments go against what the subjects themselves would take to be the best overall 
outcome.” 
It seems fair to conclude then, that the balance between greater good and personal losses is a 
dilemma to which there is no easy solution. Balancing stakeholder and national interest is the 
perennial challenge for policy-makers.  Part of the reason that globalization is so unpopular may 
be that, in order get past the powerful stakeholders such as the owners of capital in protected 
industries, policy-makers have had to shift the balance far towards being concerned with the 
greater national good.  In such an environment, the voices of already marginalized groups such as 
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peasants and indigenous peoples have almost no chance of being heard.   
Seen in the worst light, those middle class white kids protesting in the street in their wealthy 
countries are trying to stop something that has made many of the world’s poor better off.  Seen in 
the best light, they are trying to give a voice to those who otherwise have none, and pushing 
policy-makers to think harder about how to soften those sharp edges of globalization. 
4.2.  Inequality 
Critics of corporate globalization tend to consider the level of inequality to be an important 
component of social welfare, independent of its impact on poverty. If there is a trade-off between 
fairness and efficiency, they will lean towards fairness. Interestingly, the mounting evidence from 
behavioral economics research is that they are not alone.  As Fehr & Schmidt (2000, p.1) find, 
“many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity”.  And as Ken 
Rogoff (forthcoming, p.4) says “In the long-run
45, global social welfare depends fundamentally on 
fairness and happiness …”  
While the deep psychological reasons that people are concerned with fairness are still being 
unraveled, some argue that there is a practical basis for concern with inequality. Robert Wade 
(2002, p.21) provides an example of the practical justification in his argument for why we should 
be concerned about exchange-rate based inequality between countries: 
“It may, for example, predispose the elites to be more corrupt as they compare themselves to elites in 
rich countries and squeeze their own populations in order to maintain a comparable standard of living. 
It may encourage the educated people of poor countries to migrate to rich countries, and encourage 
unskilled people to seek illegal entry
46. It may generate conflict between states, and – because the 
market-exchange-rate income gap is so big – make it cheap for rich states to intervene to support one 
side or another in civil conflict.” 
                                                 
45 In this instance Rogoff was referring to the long-run as the time after which absolute poverty will have been 
eliminated. As he says in the same paper (p.1): “… we can expect that as global income inexorably expands over 
the next century, issues of inequality, rather than subsistence, will increasingly take center stage in the poverty 
debate.” 
46Thomas Straubhaar (1988) finds that net emigration from a poor country to a rich one tends to diminish when the 
wage differential between the two countries falls below 1:4. Quoted in IMF (Ch4).    32
In its Global Trends 2015 report (IFG, 2002, p.30), the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) also seemed to think inequality was worth worrying about.  According to them globalization 
would create:  
“...an even wider gap between regional winners and losers than exists today. [Globalization's] 
evolution will be rocky, marked by chronic volatility and a widening economic divide....deepening 
economic stagnation, political instability and cultural alienation. [It] will foster political, ethnic, 
ideological and religious extremism, along with the violence that often accompanies it.” 
Given then, that inequality is a common concern, the question still remains why some people 
think that globalization leads to more inequality, and others think it leads to less.  As with poverty, 
the explanation lies largely in differences in what people really mean by inequality and ‘worsening 
inequality’.   Indeed, the debate over what type of inequality we ‘should’ worry about is even 
more intense than that over poverty.  The intensity of the debate seems to be fueled by the fact that 
inequality is a genuinely complex concept.  Concepts of inequality vary significantly depending 
on the person, and depending on the framing of the issue presented to each person (Devooght, 
2003; Litchfield, 1999). 
In order to keep this paper a manageable length, we must once again apologize to an 
extensive literature (this time on the philosophical, axiomatic, and social bases for selecting 
inequality measures), and move on to the evidence that directly relates to globalization.  In short, 
we will argue that critics of globalization tend to think in either absolute dollar terms, or in terms 
of polarization between the top and bottom of the income distribution. They are also particularly 
concerned with the distribution of the gains from globalization. In contrast, proponents of 
globalization, and most academic economists, tend to use distributional measures of relative 
inequality, of which the Gini coefficient is the most popular.
47   
 
                                                 
47 Different statistics regarding the population over which inequality is being measured have also been used to 
advantage by both sides of the debate.  This issue was discussed in Section 3 under “Technical Details - 
Inequality”.   33
Inequality in the Absolute Gains from Globalization 
According to both Kanbur (2002) and Ravallion (2003) emphasis on absolute as opposed to 
relative inequality is the source of much of the perception that globalization is increasing 
inequality.
48 In support of this, Ravallion quotes experimental evidence in which 40% of 
participants were found to think about inequality in absolute terms.  To explain what he means by 
absolute inequality, he provides the following example. Consider an economy has only two 
households, one with an income of $1,000 and the other with an income of $10,000. Distribution-
neutral growth of in the economy of 100% would double both incomes, and leave the Gini 
coefficient unchanged.  However, the poorer household now has $2,000 and the richer $20,000. 
This means that the richer household gained ten times as much as the poor household. Many 
people would not consider this a fair outcome, and would probably describe it as an example of 
increased inequality, despite the fact that relative inequality is unchanged.  
The example above is also relevant to the sweatshop debate. Consider the case of a 
multinational corporation opening a factory in a developing country. The multinational provides 
better pay and conditions than similar local enterprises: say $2.20/day rather than $1.80/day. For 
the poor and unskilled in the local community, taking a job in the new factory represents an 
improvement over their previous standard of living. Meanwhile, as a result of transferring to the 
new, cheaper location, the multinational makes cost savings $18 per worker per day. Six dollars of 
this saving is spent on paying off the investment in the new factory, six dollars is passed on to 
consumers, primarily in rich countries, and corporate executives collect six dollars as a bonus. 
Despite the fact that the above situation clearly describes a Pareto improvement, many critics 
of globalization would consider the above situation a bad outcome on the basis that it was unfair.  
They would rather see a greater share of the gains going to the poor workers.  This issue is closely 
related to what Nancy Birdsall (2001, p.3) claims is the major reason for the popular perception 
that globalization is good for the rich and bad for the poor. According to her: 
                                                 
48 A pleasing development, perhaps in response to this observation, is that two recent surveys of the debate on 
inequality and globalization (Sutcliffe, 2004; Svedberg, 2004) include figures on and discussion of trends in 
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“We economists (and I put myself in that group) are missing the point. True, world poverty may be 
declining and global inequality no longer rising. But that does not mean that the global economy is fair 
or just. ...even relatively benign outcomes may belie fundamentally unequal opportunities in an unfair 
global game.” 
Combining the insights of Ravallion and Birdsall, we may conclude that many critics are 
concerned about inequality in absolute gains and in opportunities for gain from globalization. 
Polarization and Top-Driven Inequality 
Changes in inequality in absolute terms are no doubt important in the minds of many critics. 
However, a perusal of the internet suggests that there is a second concept of inequality which is 
also popular among critics of globalization. The statistics most often quoted in support of the 
negative impact of globalization on inequality are, in fact, measures of the level of relative 
inequality (cf changes in absolute inequality as discussed above). However, unlike economists’ 
measures, which are based on the entire the income distribution, the figures reported by critics of 
economic globalization usually refer simply to the polarization of the distribution.
49 That is, they 
focus only on the two ends of the distribution, which suggests a particular concern with 'top-
driven' inequality. Robert Wade provides an excellent example of the figures quoted on 
polarization. 
"Global inequality is worsening rapidly ...Technological change and financial liberalization result in a 
disproportionately fast increase in the number of house-holds at the extreme rich end, without shrinking 
the distribution at the poor end ... From 1988 to 1993, the share of the world income going to the 
poorest 10 percent of the world’s population fell by over a quarter, whereas the share of the richest 10 
percent rose by 8 percent."  
Statements such as this, which refer to changes in the relative incomes of the top and bottom 
deciles, are typical of the criticisms of economic globalization that originate in relatively rich 
                                                 
49 The same two recent surveys of inequality and globalization (Sutcliffe, 2004; Svedberg, 2004) that gave attention to 
absolute inequality also include significant discussion of polarization measures.  This shift towards more broadly 
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countries. However, according to Carol Graham (2001), top-driven inequality may also be 
important to the negative perceptions of globalization among the poor and middle class in poorer 
countries. Graham's argument is that by providing an ever-higher benchmark for comparison, top-
driven inequality leads people to under-estimate their own income gains. 
Knowing that many people think of inequality in terms of ‘absolute gains’ and polarization, 
rather than in terms of Gini coefficients, goes some way to explaining the confidence with which 
critics of economic globalization assert that it causes increased inequality. The empirical evidence 
does suggest that people do tend to gain from globalization in proportion to the amount of wealth 
they already had
50, and as Sutcliffe (2004) points out, polarization measures have tended to 
increase in recent times even when the Gini coefficient is falling.
51 
5. Dissatisfaction with the Process of Globalization 
“Capitalism is the astounding belief that the most wickedest of men will do the most wickedest of things 
for the greatest good of everyone.” 
John Maynard Keynes 
“This powerful network, which may aptly, if loosely, be called the Wall Street-Treasury complex, is 
unable to look much beyond the interest of Wall Street, which it equates with the good of the world.” 
Jagdish Bhagwati, 1998 
According to Bayesian learning theories, the conclusion that a person draws from a given set 
of information is highly dependent on the prior opinion of that person. Similarly, when faced with 
a number of conflicting information sources of unknown quality, a person will place the most 
weight on those sources which agree with their priors.
52  These theories provide a very substantial 
                                                 
50This, as Ravallion (2003) points out, is the correct way to interpret Dollar and Kraay (2001) and Dollar & Kraay 
(2002) 
51 This is particularly true for inter-country rather than true ‘world’ inequality measures, and this effect increases as 
the polarization measure becomes more extreme. For example, according to Sutcliffe’s (2004, p.28) calculations, 
the ratio of the top to bottom 1%, 5% and 10% of the world’s population has at times risen even when the ratio of 
the top to bottom 20% was falling.  This provides yet another opportunity for critics and proponents of 
globalization to disagree on trends. 
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explanation for why, despite the vast research effort directed at proving whether globalization is 
good or bad for the poor, large differences in opinion remain.  The purpose of this section is to 
explain why so many people form negative priors about the impact of globalization on the poor. 
The answer to our question begins with the observation that many critics view globalization 
as a process through which power is distilled upward and away from the poor, towards a global 
elite. As Kevin Danaher (2001), author and public education director of the large, non-profit 
organization Global Exchange, writes. 
“Within the global movement for changing how capital gets invested, there are two key questions being 
raised. First, who is sitting at the table when the investment decisions get made? Second, what are the 
values guiding the process? 
If the people sitting at the table are a mono-crop (wealthy, white males), then the policies coming from 
that decision-making process cannot reflect the needs and desires of the rest of us. ..a mono-crop of pro-
corporate voices at the decision-making table will shut out other sectors of society, such as workers, 
environmentalists, churches, community groups, and others. Thus "democracy" becomes an empty 
phrase because the diversity of voices that is essential for real democracy is blocked by those with 
power not wanting to share it.” 
Though corporate executives are the most often envisaged members of the global elite, critics 
also see it as including technocrats, bureaucrats, and politicians
53. John McMurtry (2002, p.202) 
provides a lucid and impassioned example of concern over the concentration of power associated 
with globalization in his article “Why the Protesters are Against Corporate Globalization”. 
“The ultimate subject and sovereign ruler of the world is the transnational corporation, operating by 
collective prescription and enforcement through the World Trade Organization in concert with its 
prototype the NAFTA, its European collaborator, the EU, and such derivative regional instruments as 
the APEC, the MAI, the FTAA, and so on.  
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Rule the World” and one entire chapter is titled “Building Elite Consensus”.     37
Together these constitute the hierarchical formation of the planet’s new rule by extra-parliamentary 
and transnational fiat.” 
The second half of the answer to our question “Why do people form negative priors about the 
impact of globalization on the poor?”, is that few non-economists believe that this powerful, self-
interested global elite will make decisions that maximize long-run benefits to the poor.  Indeed, 
the assumption is more commonly that the elite will make decisions that are good for the elite, and 
that what is good for the elite is almost invariably bad for the poor.
54  Consider the following 
quote from the WTO overview on the website of Global Trade Watch.
55   
“The WTO and GATT Uruguay Round Agreements have functioned principally to pry open markets for 
the benefit of transnational corporations at the expense of national and local economies; workers, 
farmers, indigenous peoples, women and other social groups; health and safety; the environment; and 
animal welfare.  In addition, the WTO system’s, rules and procedures are undemocratic, un-
transparent and non-accountable and have operated to marginalize the majority of the world’s 
people.” (emphasis added) 
While these statements are somewhat lacking in balance, they do hint at a number of 
important policy questions that have attracted some academic interest, but are deserving of much 
more.  Of all these questions, the one on which the gap between public concern and academic 
interest has been the greatest is the role of big business.  A reading of the many websites set up to 
criticize globalization reveals that this issue is the most widely held concern of the general public 
with regard to globalization. However, if you don’t have time to surf the web, evidence of this 
may easily be found in the titles of the two best selling 'anti-globalization' books; David Korten's 
                                                 
54 It is worth noting here that this is an area of important difference between critics of the current form of globalization 
and those that may be truly described as opposed to globalization.  The first group includes organizations such as 
Oxfam International and Greenpeace. These groups are global themselves, and thus their position is that global 
governance can work, however, the influential global elite needs to be expanded to include civil society in an 
equally strong role as big business.  In contrast, the latter group, which includes most notably the International 
Forum on Globalization, tend to believe that democracy will deliver better policies than a combination of 
technocracy and lobby groups, even if the lobby groups are broadly balanced.  Further, they argue that democracy 
cannot function when the representative group exceeds a certain maximum size, which is far smaller than the 
world population.  Thus they argue that global governance is inherently flawed and local, democratic self-
determination is to be preferred. 
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“When Corporations Rule the World”, and Naomi Klein's “No Logo”. However, the role of 
imperfect competition in the context of international trade and theories of multinational firms is 
less emphasized today than it was twenty years ago.  While the importance of departures from 
perfect competition was emphasized in models of strategic trade and infant industries in the 1980s, 
in the 1990s economists generally emphasized the importance of global competition in removing 
instead of enhancing market power.  
As the two book titles above suggest, people are concerned about both the political and 
market power of transnational corporations.  Concern about the political power of big business 
exists independently of concern over globalization.
56  However, critics believe globalization 
exacerbates the problem of corporate power in three ways. Firstly, it facilitates the expansion of 
the richest and most powerful corporations into countries whose governments are more susceptible 
to capture, and whose populations are far less empowered than those in their home countries. The 
most commonly cited examples of the problem are the labor conditions of footwear and clothing 
manufacturers, and damage to health and livelihoods for local populations in the vicinity of oil and 
mining operations. It is further claimed that protest and unrest by indigenous or labor groups is 
violently repressed by the national government directly, or paramilitaries, and that the foreign 
corporation either actively supports the repression, or complicity ignores it.  Some of the most 
commonly cited cases involve Nike and The Gap in Indonesia; Coca Cola in Columbia; Rio Tinto 
and Freeport McMoran’s joint venture in Irian Jaya (a reluctant part of Indonesia); and Shell in the 
Niger Delta.
57 
The second way in which globalization is believed to exacerbate problems of corporate power 
is that it involves the strengthening of supra-national institutions, to which they believe large 
corporations have disproportionate access.  The WTO is the most often criticized international 
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respondents agree that business has gained too much power over too many aspects of American life, while 74-82% 
agreed that big companies have too much influence over government policy, politicians and policy-makers in 
Washington. 
57 To learn more about these claims, simply enter the company name and location in your favorite search engine. 
Alternatively, visit the high quality site of the Global Policy Forum http://www.globalpolicy.org/ you can enter the 
key words in their Google driven search facility, or browse by category. The website contains thousands of news 
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institution in this regard, and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement is 
the most often criticized outcome of this perceived influence.
58  Thirdly, globalization is believed 
to exacerbate the problem of excessive corporate political power because it is believed to make big 
business to get even bigger, and power is believed to be proportional to size.
59  
Proponents of globalization often hold a much more optimistic view of the impact of 
globalization on corporate political power. They argue that corporate input to policy-making can 
be constructive, and that globalization actually decreases the likelihood of policy capture by 
industry.  The latter point, is supported by the observation that globalization is often associated 
with increased accountability and openness of national governments, and increased competition 
for national monopolies. In addition, it is argued that the costs of corruption and excessive 
regulation are higher in an open economy, leading to increased pressure for institutional reform 
(Bolaky & Freud, 2004). There is also empirical evidence to support these proposed linkages 
(Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Berg & Krueger, 2003)  
Bardhan (2003 & forthcoming) suggests that the forces identified by both sides of the debate 
are likely to be at work.
60 Consequently, he says, the effect of globalization on the political 
equilibrium will vary on a country by country basis, and he calls for more systematic empirical 
studies on the topic.   
We turn now to the second major source of concern with ‘corporate globalization’, that is, 
increased market concentration. This issue, according to Kanbur (2001, p.1089) is “undoubtedly 
the most potent difference in framework and perspective” in the globalization debate. Bardhan 
(2003) and Bhagwati (2002) also note that one of the fundamental differences between 
globalization's proponents and critics is that the former consider the impacts of market 
liberalization within a framework of perfect competition, while the latter consider it in the context 
of highly imperfect competition. Thus, while much economic research has considered the ability 
of globalization to reduce the market power held by previously monopolistic domestic firms, many 
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critics see globalization as a mechanism by which the oligopolistic reach of the transnational 
corporations spreads to the furthest corners of the globe.  
The important implication of the assumption of a world of imperfect competition is that it 
makes distortions in both factor and goods markets feasible.
61 Hence it is possible to believe that 
the poor are being exploited both in their role as suppliers of inputs, particularly labor, and in their 
role as consumers of finished products. A classic example of this belief was the debate in India in 
the mid-1990s. Many small farmers were suffering at the same time as many poor consumers were 
facing rapidly increasing food prices.  The culprits, some claimed, were the rapidly expanding 
foreign agribusinesses who were acting as ‘middle-men’ in the food supply chain.
62 
While it is unlikely that foreign agribusinesses were the primary cause of the consumer price 
hikes in the Indian example, there is some evidence that some large transnational corporations do 
have market power. Some major world markets are highly concentrated
63, and business executives 
continue to strive for greater market share under the belief that this is necessary in a globalized 
economy.
64 For example, according to a recent report from the FAO Committee on Commodity 
Problems (FAO, 2003) market concentration and vertical integration are ‘growing realities’ in 
grain and cereal markets, which can be traced in part to trade liberalization, aggressive export 
                                                 
61E.g. Sethi (2003, p.1) claims that “most modern economies operate under conditions of imperfect competition where 
corporations gain above-normal profits, i.e., market rent, from market imperfections. Therefore, corporations 
should be held accountable for a more equitable distribution of these above-normal profits with other groups, e. g., 
customers, employees, etc., who were deprived of their market-based gains because of market imperfections and 
corporate power.” 
Deardorff (2003) attempts to provide an economic model describing the exploitative power corporations are accused 
of exercising over labor. 
62 For example, in a speech in late 1998, the then Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee said  
“A major area of concern for all of us in the supply and distribution of essential commodities is the exploitative role 
of middlemen. This was evident even in the recent spurt in prices - the difference between wholesale and retail 
prices of onion, potatoes, pulses and edible oils was sometimes in the 200 per cent to 300 per cent band.  
The worst irony is that increased purchase price for the consumer does not mean better sale price for the farmer. 
Prices of agriculture produce often fluctuate so wildly from year to year due to market manipulations by 
middlemen, that sustainable crop planning becomes a near impossibility.”  
See also Shiva (2002), FAO (2001) 
63 For example, in autos, the top five firms account for almost 60 percent of global sales. In electronics, the top five 
firms have over half of global sales. And, the top five firms have over 30 percent of global sales in airlines, 
aerospace, steel, oil, personal computers, chemical, and the media. These figures are from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International and the International Data Corporation, quoted in The Economist, "A Game of Global Monopoly" 
March 27, 1993, p. Survey 17.  
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promotion policies, and privatization of government trading entities. Ghemawat & Ghadar (2000) 
however, argue that hard empirical evidence that globalization of an industry drives increased 
concentration of that industry is lacking.  Bardhan (2003) suggests that the impact of globalization 
on market concentration is in need of more empirical investigation. However, he adds that even if 
the issue is validated empirically, protesters should be lobbying for better anti-trust laws, not more 
trade restrictions. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to explain why criticisms of globalization’s impact on the poor 
continue to abound, despite the general consensus that liberalization promotes growth, and growth 
is good for the poor.  The explanation consisted of four parts.  Firstly, many people view the 
empirical evidence in favor of globalization skeptically because they see globalization as a process 
through which power is concentrated upward and away from the poor.  In particular, they see 
transnational corporations as gaining a disproportionate amount of both political and market 
power.  Critics of globalization are also firmly of the opinion that corporations will use their 
increased power in ways that benefit themselves, and harm the poor. 
Though these concerns are not without basis, there are mediating factors that make it difficult 
to conclude that globalization is increasing corporate power, or that increased corporate power is 
necessarily bad for the poor. On the first point it is important to remember that globalization 
exposes many previously powerful national corporations to outside competition, and requires 
greater transparency in government policy-making.  On the second point, it may be that the 
efficiency benefits of large corporations outweigh any losses from increased market power. Thus it 
would seem that there is room for more empirical research to determine whether the ‘corporate 
globalization’ does indeed give the poor cause for concern. 
The next part of our explanation focused on the multiplicity of meanings of the phrases 
‘worsening poverty’ and ‘increasing inequality’.  The discussion in regard to poverty followed on 
from Ravi Kanbur’s (2001) work which identified four major differences between the concepts of 
poverty employed by globalization’s critics and proponents.  These four dimensions are: the total    42
number of poor verses poverty incidence, monetary verses multi-dimensional measures, level of 
aggregation, and time horizon.  We argued that although level of aggregation and time horizon do 
appear to be important distinctions, they are both emblematic of a more general concern that the 
poor should not be the ones to bear the adjustment costs of globalization. 
We then examined the implications of each of these different concepts to our assessment of 
the progress of the last twenty years. It was argued that invariably some groups of poor are 
adversely affected by globalization, even when a much larger number of poor are made better off.  
Thus concern for negatively affected subgroups will always lead to a less favorable assessment of 
the impact of globalization.  In the presence of strong population growth, looking at total number 
of poor rather than poverty incidence also leads to a predictably more pessimistic assessment.  
However, the implications of including non-monetary dimensions of poverty are less clear. Many 
people clearly believe that liberalization will lead to negative impacts on non-monetary 
dimensions of poverty, but the empirical evidence on this mixed.  
In regard to inequality we argued that economic research generally applies measures of the 
shape of the income distribution, while many of the criticisms of globalization are based on 
polarization and on changes in absolute inequality. The latter concept is related to the observation 
that the poor often do not have equal access to the opportunities presented by globalization 
(Birdsall, 2001; Winters et al, 2004).  Both polarization and absolute changes in inequality tend to 
indicate rising inequality more often than the measures of inequality preferred by economists. 
The next section showed that there remain important, unresolved methodological issues in the 
calculation of even the most fundamental poverty and inequality measures.  Foremost among these 
issues are the use of household survey data verses national accounts data to estimate average 
national incomes, and the method of comparing incomes across countries and over time.  Both of 
these issues have major implications for our assessment of the last twenty years. Until we reach a 
consensus on them, there will be empirical support for both optimistic and pessimistic views of the 
period of globalization. 
   43
Global trends over the last twenty years, however, are not the best facts on which to base 
claims about the benefits or otherwise of globalization.  Thorough empirical work, which links 
specific policy measures to poverty outcomes, provides a far better basis.   The empirical work to 
date has contributed to a broad acceptance that trade and foreign direct investment are growth 
promoting. Yet much work remains to show which policies can reduce the adjustment costs bourn 
by the poor, and maximize the share of the benefits they obtain from globalization. 
Overall it seems that the difference of opinion between globalization's supporters and critics 
can be largely explained by differences in prior views and priorities, as well as current ambiguities 
in the empirical evidence. Rather than viewing criticism as a burden to be thrown off as quickly as 
possible, policy-makers and researchers alike could do well to heed its message: That ‘good’ isn’t 
good enough. We owe it to the world’s poor to do better. 
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Appendix 1. Summary of Remaining Disagreements
 
Strong Globalizers  Cautious Globalizers 
Globalization is good for the poor.  Globalization is bad for the poor.  
Inequality should not be a concern, as long as poverty 
is decreasing. Relative inequality is the appropriate 
measure of inequality. 
Absolute inequality should be a concern in its own 
right, regardless of poverty outcomes. 
The proportion of the population living in poverty is 
the appropriate measure of poverty outcomes. 
The absolute number of people living in poverty 
matters more than the proportion. 
Current income-based measures are sufficient for 
answering most questions regarding the benefits of 
globalization. 
Poverty measures should include empowerment and 
vulnerability. 
More liberal trade is always better.  Total trade liberalization may not be the best means 
of promoting trade in the longer term, and even if it 
is, it may come at too great a cost in terms of social 
and environmental policies. Totally free trade is 
unlikely to be the optimal policy, and the optimal 
policy mix will be case specific. 
It is optimal for developing countries to unilaterally 
liberalize their economies. 
Developing countries should refuse to further 
liberalize their economies until the major economic 
powers genuinely improve access for developing 
country exports.  
The way in which growth is achieved makes little 
difference to distributional outcomes; therefore 
governments should employ policies that focus on 
maximizing growth. 
Maximizing short-term growth is not necessarily the 
way to produce sustainable reductions in poverty.  
Governments should place minimal controls on FDI 
in order to attract as much as possible. 
Governments should place controls on FDI in order 
to maximize the welfare gain to the host country. 
Policies that improve the profitability of large foreign 
corporations should be undertaken because these 
corporations provide jobs for unskilled workers and 
bring in new technology. 
Policies that improve the profitability of large foreign 
corporations should not be undertaken as the poor 
and the environment inevitably pay for the extra 
profits gained. 
Though the provision of safety nets is important, lack 
of safety nets should not be used as a reason for 
delaying liberalization.  
Liberalization should not proceed until adequate 
safety nets are in place. 
Government provision of essential services such as 
health, education, water and power is inefficient 
and/or corrupt; therefore these activities should be 
privatized. This can be done without negative effects 
on the poor by provision of subsidies or vouchers. 
Government provision of essential services is the 
only means of ensuring all the poor have access to 
these them at a reasonable standard. Privatization 
will have severe negative consequences for the poor.
Opening economies to foreign trade and investment 
improves competitiveness and eliminates 
inefficiencies caused by national monopoly power.  
Opening economies to foreign trade and investment 
eliminates smaller local firms and further extends the 
oligopolistic power of the transnational corporations.51 
Strong Globalizers  Cautious Globalizers 
Large reductions in wages in previously protected 
sectors is merely evidence that these sectors were 
earning monopoly rents that they were sharing with 
their workers.  
Large reductions in wages in previously protected 
sectors send many previously middle class towards 
poverty. It is evidence of the shift towards 
corporations in relative bargaining power that 
accompanies opening. 
Opening reduces the potential for capture of 
economic and political power by local elites. 
The evidence is that integration with world markets 
is associated with relative increases in the incomes of 
the very rich.  This makes it difficult to believe that 
their economic and political power has shifted 
towards the lower income brackets. If anything, local 
elites must now share their power with international 
elites.   
Political reform is necessary in many developing 
countries; liberalization will provide a catalyst for 
reform. 
The effect on the political equilibrium will be case 
specific, and it is highly possible that liberalization 
will have detrimental effects. 
It is appropriate to have enforceable super-national 
trade and investment agreements. They will 
ultimately lead to an optimal outcome.  
Either: Nation states should not relinquish power to 
international bodies, since democracy does not 
function at such a high level. 
Or: Economically oriented international bodies such 
as the WTO need to be balanced by equally powerful 
international organizations whose primary concerns 
are social and environmental. 
 
 